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The Sovereignty of the Courts
Edward H. Levi*
I began these talks on American jurisprudence by
stating my agreement with Professor H. L. A. Hart
that "American speculative thought about the gen.
eral nature of law . . . is marked by a concentration,
almost to the point of obsession, on the judicial process." "In fact:' Professor Hart wrote, "the most fa.
mous decisions of the Supreme Court have at once
been so important and controversial in character and
so unlike what ordinary courts ordinarily do in deciding cases that no serious jurisprudence or philosophy of law could avoid asking with what general
conception of the nature of law were such judicial
powers compatible ...
.
The distinctive quality of American jurisprudence
and of the American style of government is to be
found in the role of the courts. There may be other
distinctive qualities, but for an understanding of
American jurisprudence and government, the role
of the courts must be recognised and explored.
The origin of this power of the courts is important.

First, it reflects the persistence and reemergence of
natural rights or natural law themes, against that
classical background which gives a kind of common
law to our thinking about the nature of law. I explored last time the distinctions about justice made
in this classical background, and the reflections of
this thinking in later and newer formulations.'Ibday
one finds a renewal of conscious reformulations. The
strength of the natural rights or natural law themes
was increased in American history by our colonial
origin in which supervision by courts and other
agencies played a large part, and in which the col.
oniets hoped to get the help of the courts for the
protection or assertion of their rights. The role
played by James Otis, as reported by John Adams,
in the 1761 Writs of Assistance Case, is a dramatic

illustration of this. The colonists had an image-an
idea-of what courts could do. The colonists knew
the older cases of 17th-century England. They cited
*Glen A. Uoyd Distinguished Service Proflesor and President
Emeritus, University of Chicago. This paper is the original text of
the third of three talks on American jurisprudence at the 1980
Salzburg Seminar in American Studies.
1H. L. A. Hart, "American Jurisprudence Through English Eyes:
The Nightmare and the Noble Dream." 11 Ga.L.Rev 969 (1976).
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these cases. They did not read them in the same way
that the English-after parliamentary supremacy
was achieved there-came to read them. Phraphrasing or quoting three Chief Justices of the Common
Pleas or the King's Bench-Coke, Hobart, and
Holt-the colonists assumed courts could mold legislation or set legislation aside in response to the
demands of natural rights, or equity, or natural reason, or repugnancies or contradictions. Thus one answer to Hart's question as to what conception of the
nature of law these powers of the American courts
were compatible with is: the conception of law the
colonists believed the English courts had.
Asecond element which shaped our courts was the
growth of positivism in the 18th and 19th centuries.
Positivism carried with it-although it didn't have
to-the idea that law was a closed system. Positivism
emerged as a result of the clash between the natural
law view and the new order of the monopoly of official power of the nation-state. Thus positivism
came to assume two things: First-the point always
made-that law is a command of the sovereign.
There might be other interesting and persuasive
directives from other sources. But it was the command of the sovereign which made positive law. This
was the law the court enforced. Second-and usually
not stressed as much as the first, but equally im.portant-was the idea there was a coherence among
the commands, so one command would not be repugnant to another. The rule of law was a coherent
logical rule, and it was within the web of this logical
structure that the courts found and applied what the
command was. The view was that the court made
law only, as Holmes said, "interstitially. Its discretion usually was to appear as limited. In this tradition the written constitution could be viewed as
the command of the sovereign par excellence.
But positivism never did escape from-indeed it
incorporated within itself-the older tradition as to
how courts knew what the law was. There was a
claim to a special professional competence. The court
was able to know what the law was and apply it
because law was a discipline acquired, as Fortescue
had said, only after twenty years of lamp-lit hard
study. This is essentially what Coke told KingJames
in asserting the independence ofJudges in the Writs
of Prohibition caie in 1807.
Sir Matthew Hale, who became Chief Justice of
the King's Bench in 1671, was one of the few early
writers who concerned himself with some analysis
2

of the discipline used by courts in making determinations.' He viewed the common law of England as
composed of (1) common usage or custom; (2) the
authority of Parliament "introducing such laws";
and (3) "judicial decisions of Courts of justice, consonant to one another in the Series and Successions
of time." Judicial decisions, he wrote, "are for the
matter of them three kinds.' There were those judicial decisions which had their reasons "singly in
the laws and customs of this Kingdom;' where "the
law or custom of the realm is the only Rule and
Measure to judge by" In such a situation the decisions of courts were "the Conservatories and Evidences ofthose laws" But there were other situations
where reasoning of the courts would have to proceed
through deductions and inference-"illation,' Hale
said and Austin later repeated, "from Authorities or
Decisions ofFormer Times in the same or like Cases,
and then the Reason of the Thing itself." Then, importantly, there were situations "such as seem to
have no other Guide but the Common Reason of the
Thing ... as in the exposition of the intention in
Deeds, Wills, Covenants, etc!' In such cases the
"Judge does much better than what a bare grave
Grammarian or Logician, or other prudent Men
could do, for in many Cases there have been former
Resolutions, either in Point or agreeing in Reason
or Analogy with the Case in Question, or perhaps
also the Clause to be expounded is mingled with
some Terms or Clauses that require Knowledge of
the Law to help out with the Construction or Exposition ... and doubtless a good Common Lawyer

is the best expositor of such clauses!'
Lord Hale described the authority and special competence of the courts this way: The courts "do not
make a law properly so called (for that only the King
and Parliament can do); yet they have a great Weight
and Authority in Expounding, Declaring, and Publishing what the Law of this Kingdom is, especially
when such Decisions hold a Consonancy and Congruity with Resolutions and Decisions of former
Times; and tho' such Decisions are less than a Law,
yet they are a greater Evidence thereof than the
Opinion of any private Persons, as such, whatsoever."
The judges are "chosen by the King for that Employment, as being of greater Learning, Knowledge
and Experience in the Laws than others. .. they are
'Sir Matthew Hale, The Historyof the Common Law of England,
ch. 4 (Chicago: U. Chi. Press, 1971), pp. 44-46.
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upon their Oaths to judge according to the Laws of
the Kingdom . . . they have the best Helps to inform
their Judgments" (By the "beat Helps." Hale meant

the members of the bar.) They sit as atribunal, "and
their Judgments are strengthened and upheld by the
Laws of this Kingdom, till they are by the same Law
revers'd or avoided."
The judges, then, were experts in the law. Hale
recognized, as modern judges do and worry about,
that society has other experts. There were men of
great reason and learning who engaged in "high
Speculations and abstract Notions touching Justice
and Right," but those kinds of experts "are most
Commonly the worst Judges that can be, because

they are transported from the Ordinary Measures
of right and wrong by their over-fine Speculacons
(sic), Theoryes (sic), and distinctions above the
Comon (sic) Staple of humane (sic) Conversations
A third element which entered into the jurisprudence and expectation of the American courts was
concern about majority rule. Why is it just that the
majority should compel the dissenting minority? The

concern revealed a conflict between a theory of natural rights which could not be given away and the
assumptions of popular sovereignty based upon a
social compact resting upon consent. Justice Story
in his Commentaries on the Constitution when die-

cussing the theories about consent as the basis for
the American social compact was uneasy about the
compact idea, because many citizens he knew had
not in fact consented.* Nevertheless it was often said,
men achieved freedom in the rule of law. Kant had
said that. Rousseau had justified the rule of the majority on the basis of a general will in which all
participated. But why were the members of the minority to be bound when they disagreed? Did the
general will as found by the majority have to be such
that the minority would have agreed if they had
understood, and was its binding effect dependent
upon a correct result good for the whole society?
What curb was there to be on the will ofthe majority?
It is especially interesting that Jefferson himself, in
spite of his view that the courts had no right to decide
matters of constitutionality for the legislative or ex3
8ir Matthew Hale.CriticismsonHa6esDialoea'fthrCowon
Low, in Holdsworth, History ofnglish Law, vol.5,2nd ed. (Boston:
Little, Brown, 1937) p 503.
'Joseph Story, Comnmutarie on the Constitution of the United
States (Boston: Hilliard. Gray & Co.. 18838), 29.
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ecutive departments-and his irritation with the
power assumed by courts of construing statutes equitably to their own liking-in urging a bill of rights,
stressed the importance of "the legal check which it
puts into the hands of the judiciary"' The constitutionalism of the American republic was a limitation
on popular sovereignty. It was a different, perhaps
unique, answer to the problem of the general will.
Afourth element, as the American courts came to
see their task, was really a part of the positivist view
of law as a science. If law was a science, then much
legislation stood in need of being corrected to fit with
the science. Lemuel Shaw, later Chief Justice of the
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, in 1827
gave a much admired address to the bar in which he
urged that it was the bar's task to keep fresh and in
order the science of law. It was a difficult task because there were so many state legislatures wont to
pass laws on so many subjects and-the implication
was-in so many unscientific ways, with results that
didn't fit the science. He appealed to the bar to curb
this unprofessional legislative approach.* (I realize
while this was put in terms of law as a science, it
could also be read as reflecting a particular set of
policy views.)
Writing about the American legal system in the
19th century, Professor Barrett Wendell in the Cambridge Modern History saw a part of the role of the
American courts as making livable "the incredible
confusion of American legislation .... If the wording
of carelessly drawn preposterous or conflicting statutes can be stretched into practical consistency, the
Courts may usually be trusted so to stretch it" "The
(American Judiciary) . . . has instinctively accepted

its real office, which has been to establish and to
preserve such order as should enable the community
to manage its affairs prosperously. It has always remembered that, in so doing, it must pretend to base
its decisions on principles presumed to be established. But, so long as a decision referred to these
principles has proved momentarily efficient, it has
rarely troubled itself much about their historic truth
or their technical validity." (At this point I suppose
Letter to James Madison, March 15, 1789, in J. G. do Roulhe
Hamilton, TheBest Letters of Thomas Jefferson (New York: Houghton Mifflin, 1926), p. 51.
*Lamuel Shaw, Am. Jurist56 (1952).
Marnett Wendell, The Cambride Modern History, vol.7 (Cambridge: Cambridge U. Prses), p. 735.

Ibid. 7S6.
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I should admit that Professor Wendell was not aprofessor of law, but a professor of English.)
Professor Wendell's account is at least more palatable than the outrageous report which Austin records of the treatment of legislation in the United
States around the 1830s. According to Austin, Colonel Murat, "son of the late King of Naples, who,
curiously enough, has practiced as an English barrister in the Floridas and seems to have avery pretty
knowledge of the English law . .. says that the ...

Acts of the legislatures of those States in which he
has resided, are habitually overruled by the judges
and the bar. At the beginning of every term they
meet and settle what of the Acts of the preceding
session of the legislature they will abide by; and such
is the general conviction of the incapacity of the
State legislature, and of the comparative capacity
and the experiences of the judges and the bar, that
the public habitually acquiesce in this proceeding.
Accordingly, if a law, which the profession have
agreed not to obey, is cited in judicial proceedings,
it is absolutely rejected and put down by the lawyers
sans ceremonie."'

The American courts combined the traditions and
outlooks of these sources and influences. On the one
hand there was the free court which protected the
rights of free individuals, or natural rights, which
was not the same as protecting popular sovereignty;
on the other hand, there was the court as the interpreter of the law, that is equipped through special
study and a discipline to find the meaning of words,
to understand situations, and to know the importance of similar treatment. Constitutionalism combined these two aspects. It claimed for the court a
protective automaticity in the construction of statutes or constitutional provisions-as Marshall did
in Marbury v.Madison. It claimed also for the court
the understanding of words which were gateways to
the natural law or natural rights. This was why during the era of substantive due process in 1879, Judge
Andrews of the New York Court of Appeals, in eustaining an absolute liability statute agEnst the
owner of premises used by a lessee, with the owner's
knowledge, for the sale of liquor, could write: "The
theory that laws may be declared void when deemed
to be opposed to natural justice and equity, although
they do not violate any constitutional provision, has
$John Austn, Lectures on Jurkpredene, vol. 2 (London: John
Murray, 1869). p.678.
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some support in the dicta of learned judges, but has
not been approved, so far as we know, by any au.
thoritative adjudication, and is repudiated by numerous authorities. Indeed, under the broad and liberal interpretation now given to constitutional
guarantees, there can be no violation offundamental
rights of legislation which will not fall within the
express or implied prohibition and restraints of the
Constitution, and it is unnecessary to seek for principles outside of the Constitution under which such
legislation may be condemned!"o
Judge Andrews was writing five years after Loan
Association v. Topeka' in the United States Supreme

Court which held unconstitutional a state statute
without reference to any specific constitutional provision but rather to inherent limitations on governmental power "which grow out of the essential nature of all free governments!' In a later case Justice
Miller implied that his Tbpeka opinion was based on
"prnciples of general constitutional law," perhaps a
reminder of Chief'Justice Marshall's language in his
summation in Fletcher v.Peck of "general principles
which are common to our free institutions."
7bpeka was followed by the famous or infamous
Lochner case' 2 in the United States Supreme Court
in 1905 where the Court struck down as unconstitutional a New York statute which would have limited the number of hours per week (60 hours), and
per day (10) for those working in a bakery. The statute was condemned as an invasion of "liberty" protected by the Fourteenth Amendment which had
been passed as a result of the Civil War and was
applicable to the states, as the Fifth Amendment,
with much of the same language, was applicable to
the federal government. Mr. Justice Peckham said:
"The general right to make a contract in relation to
his business is part of the liberty protected by the
Fourteenth Amendment of the federal constitution.
. .. The right to purchase or sell labor is part of the
liberty. .. " It was to this opinion that Mr. Justice

Holmes wrote his dissent which included the sentence: "The Fourteenth Amendment does not enact
Mr. Herbert Spencer's Social Statics." More significantly, Holmes said: "I think the word liberty in the
Fourteenth Amendment is perverted when it is held
'"Bertholfv. O'ReIlly, 74 N.Y. 609 (1879).
1187 U.S. 655 (1874); see Davidson v. New Orleans, 96 U.S. 97 at
105 (1877).
12Lochner v. New York. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
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to prevent the natural outcome of a dominant opinion, unless it can be said that a rational and fair
man necessarily would admit that the statute pm
posed would infringe fundamental principles, as they
have been understood by the traditions of our people
and our law." One has to notice that even Justice
Holmes was accepting the position of the superintendence of a court over legislation to the extent that
it was similar to a court setting aside a verdict of a
jury. The maijority, of course, denied that the Judgment of the court was being substituted for that of
the legislature. The question was not policy but
solely whether the legislation was within the power
of the state. It used the shield of automaticity.
In explaining the present position of the Court, I
suppose one must also make at least passing reference to. the natural tendency on the part of govern.
mental powers to expand when they can do so. One
could make a good argument, indeed, that this was
the intentional design, or in any event the necessary
consequence, of the American constitution; that is,
when one department becomes weak or vulnerable,
another grows stronger to take up the slack. The
doctrine is usually put the other way. The American
government was founded with a separation ofpowers
theory, and with a theory of federalism-both reflecting a distrust of government. The form compels
competition among the branches of government. In
this competition the courts have done well. Severe
attacks upon the court have not prevented its apparent gain injurisdiction and influence. One would
have thought, for example, that the decision in the
Dred Scot case in 1856, which held the Missouri
compromise unconstitutional and denied the right
of the free states to make a black a citisen of the
United States--and also the power of Congress to do
so-would have greatly weakened the Supreme
Court. The opinion of'Chief'Justice Taney is regarded
as a disaster. But, as Professor Rostow points out,
ten years and a civil war later, the Court was as
strong as ever, holding that Lincoln as President had
no right to have an active southern sympathiser
(accused of conspiring against the government, affording aid and comfort to rebels, and inciting the
people to insurrection) tried by a military commis.
sion in a border state, and apparently determining
that the Congress would have "no power to indemnify the officers who composed the commission
against liability in a civil court for acting as members" of the commission. Chief Justice Chase in a
8

separate opinion wondered whether this kind of a
decision, limiting national power to use military tribunals in border areas when "some portions of the
country are invaded, and all are exposed to invasion"
was a realistic approach to the Civil War experience
or for future contingencies of a similar kind.13
The ability to decide matters of this kind after the
fact is of great help in this competition, and this
vision of hindsight is probably necessary to maintain
the kind of moral commitment required to values
which underlie constitutional doctrines. The Japanese west coast exclusion cases are illustrative. Because of the threat of Japanese invasion of the west
coast following Pearl Harbor and the fear of sabotage
and espionage, the Roosevelt administration, acting
through a military commander for the area, required
Americans of Japanese descent to leave certain
areas, to go to assembly and relocation centers, and
then, until released, to live in these war relocation
centers. This was in 1942. In 1943, the Court upheld
the curfew order which was part of this scheme.,
Then in 1944, it upheld the criminal sanction for the
requirement of removal from the area,) but at the
same time, in a separate case, held unlawful the
detention of loyal American citizens in the relocation centers." Most people I am sure today approve
of this last decision, and disapprove of the policy
behind the removal of Americans of Japanese ancestry from the west coast, since it infringes an important principle and now seems to have been not
only unnecessary but corrupted by a mingling of improper motives. It did not seem so unnecessary in
1942, although the danger had passed in 1944.
The Supreme Court did not come out ofthis episode
with all of its flags flying, but after the fact it did
leave one-perhaps small-flag for civil liberties. It
is more diflicult for an executive who has to act to
do that. The Court has a special ability to compromise, to speak enigmatically, to explain later, to
change.
In a separate opinion in the 1944 Korematsucase,
which upheld the use of the criminal sanction in the
civil courts for removal from the area, Justice Jackson, in dissent, posed one of the dilemmas for a lawabiding and court-governed society. Justice Jackson
Bf perse Milligan. 4 Wall. (71 U.S.) 2 (1886).
"Hrabeyashi v. United States. 320 US. 61 (1943).
fKoremateu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
ISr pars Mitsure Endo, 323 .S. 283 (1944).
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was not critical of the military commander for is.
suing the order for removal. Justice Jackson said he
could not find in the evidence before him that the
commanding General's orders were not reasonably
expedient military precautions, nor could he say
they were. "The armed services" he wrote, "must
protect a society, not merely its constitution.... Defense measures will not, and often should not, be
held within the limits that bind civil authorities in
peace. . . .The military reasonableness of these orders can only be determined by military superiors.
... The chief restraint upon those who command the

physical forces of the country, In the future as in the
past, must be their responsibility to the political
judgments of their contemporaries and to the moral
judgments ofthistory" In his opinion, Justice Jackson
also wrote, "But once a judicial opinion rationalises
... the Constitution to show that the Constitution
sanctions such an order, the Court for all times has
validated the principle of racial discrimination in
criminal procedure and of transplanting American
citizens." He "did not suggest that the courts should
have attempted to interfere with the Army in carrying out its task." But he did not think "they may
be asked to execute a military expedient that has no
place in law under the Constitution."
Justice Jackson's dissent suggests a boundary between court-directed law and certain governmental
actions. As though in partial comment on this, Professor Lon Fuller has written, "The internal morality
of law... is not and cannot be a morality appropriate
for every kind of governmental action."? Such
boundaries do not find easy acceptance. One wonders
in a country of law, if such an occasion should arise
again, what would a president do, what would a
military commander do-what assurance would be
required or appropriate that the Constitution was
not being violated?
The special continuity of the Court also makes it
possible for it to renounce in time its own doctrines.
The substantive due process doctrine ofLochner was
publicly renounced by the Court in 1963 in the case
of Ferguson v. Skrupa.18 The doctrine which lbpeka
helped spawn in 1874 had come under terrific attack
in the New Deal days, and before, since it was one
of the bulwarks against social legislation. It was only
"Lan Fuller, Th Moroy ofaw, rev. al. (New Haven Yale U.
PreM, 1969), p. 171.
1872 U.S. 726 (1968).
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right that it should be declared moribund about 100
years after 7bpeka so that it could be immediately
revived, as it was, for cases of personal liberties."
If it is the Court's fAmetion to give to the country it
governs the doctrines it needs for a particular time,
as well as some other doctrines forever, then the
change in substantive due process is a good example.
The change in the separate but equal doctrine for
racial discrimination is another example.
The growing strength of the Supreme Court, and
therefore the courts in general-although the courts
have had to face difficult periods which they have
sometimes done with great courage-is to be contrasted with the position of the executive under the
American constitution. Save in war time-and one
does not know what that situation might be-the
American presidency is a weak office. It has long
been acknowledged to be weak, although this is frequently forgotten. Woodrow Wilson, writing his doctoral dissertation at Johns Hopkins University in
1885, thought the presidency under the American
constitution was so weak that the only hope was to
change the American government into a more parliamentary form.
I turn now for a quick moment to comment on the
alternation of stages of behavior which it seems one
may expect in judiciary law.
Karl LIewellyn and more recently Grant Gilmore,
for example, have seen the behavior of American
courts as falling into three stages. Gilmorest called
his three stages as follows: First there was the age
of discovery. It went from the American revolution
through to the Civil War in 1860. That period was
one where we developed our own great judges: Marshall, Story, Kent, Shaw and others. There was great
admiration for Lord Mansfield-at a time when his
reputation in England had faded somewhat. Industrialization was going ahead in the United States
and with it the development of commercial law. It
was a time for the creation of new doctrines. There
were the first rumblings of a desire for codification.
While Blackstone'sCommentarieswas still for a long

time the dominant work, the American treatises on
law of Kent and Story were being written and pubv.Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
"Woodrow Wilson, CongressionalGovernment:A Study inAmericon Politics,ch. 5 (New York: Houghton Mlifflin, 1885) pp. 242-93.
sGrant Gilmore, The Ages ofAmerican Law (New Haven: Yale
U. Prese, 1977).
1eGriswold
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lished. We developed our own doctrine of precedent.
The second period, according to Gilmore, was the
age of faith. This age went from the end of the Civil
War to the beginning of World War 1.The age of faith
had a shared belief in the power of the reigning establishment. It was the age of substantive due pro.
cess used to protect property rights from the legislation of the states. It was the age of reconstruction
following the Civil War and the occupation of the
South. The Fourteenth Amendment, which arose out
of the Civil War, in its terms declared that "No state
shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge
the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United
States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws" The Supreme Court in 1873
in the SlaughterHouse Casesn refused to apply this

amendment to hold unconstitutional a state statute
in Louisiana which gave a monopoly of the slaughtering business in the New Orleans area, even
though it was claimed that the statute deprived individuals the freedom to engage in the business of
their own choosing. The Court said the Fourteenth
Amendment was adopted mainly if not exclusively
to help the former black slaves and that it was not
intended as a general matter to transfer the security
and protection of civil rights from the state governments to the federal government. The Court realized
that the amendment had changed the balance between the states and the national government somewhat, but not that much. 'b quote the Court: "Under
the pressure of all the excited feeling growing out
of the war, our statesmen have still believed that the
existence of the States with powers for domestic and
local government, including the regulation of civil
rights--the rights of persons and property-was essential to the perfect working of our complex form
of government, though they have thought proper to
impose additional limitations on the States, and to
confer additional power on that of the Nation"
But this did not keep the Court, one year later,
from declaring unconstitutional a state statute in
the 'bpeka case permitting the grant of funds in the
form of bonds to private manufacturing firms whose
industry was of support to a city. But this statute,
viewed by the Court as similar to an enactment that
MSlaughter-House Cases,
83 U.S. 36 (1873).
1383 U.S. at 82.
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the homestead owned by A should henceforth be the
property ofB (to takifrom Peter and give it to Paul,
Justice Symonds had said in Giddings v.Brown in
1657] apparently required no reference to a specific
constitutional provision to hold its application void.
It violated the "limitations ... which grow out of the
essential nature of all free governments" Otherwise
the government would be "but a despotism."
Then in 1883 in the Civil Rights Cases,0 the Court
held unconstitutional the federal statute which
made it a criminal offense to deny accommodations
in an inn or public conveyance or a theatre or other
place of public amusement on the basis of race or
color. The cases involved this kind of denial to black
persons. The Court said this was not state action
(although it followed a state custom from the slavery
period), and the Fourteenth Amendment only applied to state action. Moreover, the Court said, "If
this legislation is appropriate for enforcing the pro.
hibitions of the amendment, it is difficult to see
where it is to stop. Why may not Congress with equal
show of authority enact a code of laws for the enforcement and vindication of all rights of life, liberty
and property?"" And the Court seemed to deny any
special required continued concern for the former
slaves. It said: "When a man has emerged from slavery, and by the aid of beneficent legislation has
shaken off the inseparable concomitants of that
state, there must be some stage in the progress of
hie elevation when he takes the ranks of a mere
citizen, and ceases to be a special favorite of the law,
and when his rights as a citizen or as a man, are to
be protected in the ordinary modes by which other
men's rights are protected.""
Eugene Rostow explains the Civil Rights Caseson
the basis that the country was tired-tired of the
Civil War and the problems of reconstruction; that
if a court is to reflect the emerging collective morality. of a society, this thrust for better treatment
of the blacks was not then part of the "inner condition of the law"
Then in 1896, in the case of Plessy v. Ferguson,"

the Court upheld the state action of a statute of Louisiana which required separate accommodations in
2109 U.S. 8 (1883).
35109 U.S. at 14.
"100 U.S. at 25.
VEugeneRostow, Theldent in Law (Chicago: U. Chi. Press, 1978),
p. 60.

"168 U.S. 537 (896).
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intrastate railroads for black persons and white persons. This is where the doctrine of separate but
equal, which held sway for 58 years, until Brown v.
Board of Education3 set it aside, comes from. The
Court in Plessy v.Ferguson said that "The object of
the [Fourteenthl Amendment was undoubtedly to
enforce the absolute equality of the two races before
the law, but in the nature of things it could not have
been intended to abolish distinctions based upon
color, or to enforce social, as distinguished from political equality, or a commingling of the two races
upon terms unsatisfactory to either""
In the meantime, the Court continued to find the
Fourteenth Amendment useful as a shield against
social reform legislation in the states on the ground
of substantive due process. Hence the Lochner case
in 1905.
Gilmore describes this second period of our law,

from the end of the Civil War to the time of World
War I, as "the law's black night. .. . Never had lawyers and judges been so confident, so self-assured, so
convinced beyond the shadow of a doubt, that they
were serving not only righteousness but truth.""
There was faith that the inner workings of the law
were automatically on the right track. It was the
time of the development of the case method in

American law schools. It was indeed a period which
became one of positive law, viewed as a closed system. For some quixotic and paradoxical reason, according to Gilmore, Holmes was the intellectual darling of this era. This was because Holmes, with a
mixture of both cynicism and optimism, saw law in

an evolutionary framework, where the form of law
would accommodate as the substance changed in
some evolutionary way, according to influences be-

yond human reach.
The third stage, according to Gilmore, begins with
the period after World War I and continues through
the present. Gilmore calls this the Age of Anxiety.

He thinks that the beginning of this age is symbolized by Chief Judge-later Justice-Cardozo, who
realized that creation, not discovery, was the proper

function of a judge, but in a setting of the pattern
of legal reasoning. It was a time when the legal realists came into prominence with their attacks on legal
positivism as a closed system. It was realized that
347 U.S. 483 (1954).
0163
U.S. at 544.
1

3 Gilmore, The Agesaf American Law. 41.
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legal reasoning was a technique which could be used
to change the law, to make it responsive to different
values and ideas. Proper legal realists, aside from
describing law as simply an argumentative technique, began to worry about how better social results
could be achieved, and how the symbole of law could
be used for that purpose. But it was-and continues
to be-according to Gilmore, an age of anxiety-one
of doubts, problems, and uncertainty. Gilmore hints
that we might be in a fourth stage today, but he
perhaps is too anxious to tell us what it is.
Karl Llewellyn also divided American law into
three stages with roughly the same periods as Gilmore later used.n In the beginning and up to the
time of the Civil War, what Llewellyn called the
Grand Style was dominant. After the Civil War to
the end of World War I, the Formal Style was dominant. But then after World War I and at least until
1960, the Grand Style returned. In the Grand Style,
the judge, in making his determination of the law
and in applying the law, explicitly takes into account
the needs of policy. Precedent is also taken into account, and is more persuasive if it comes from a good
judge. Moreover, in applying the law and changing
it, it is of importance that the judge move with the
grain of the law; that is, his opinion must fit in and
help shape the momentum ofthe law. The judge must
not attempt the impossible.
The Formal Style was very different. The doctrine
of the separation of powers which allocates change
to the legislature denies creation to the court. The
existing legal authorities are regarded as containing
all the answers. Justice is relevant-where there are
problems where answers seem doubtful-but clarity
and certainty of rule are the true goals of a court.
But even legislation, if it changes things too much,
particularly the pattern which the Court has lived
by and created, is to be frowned upon, narrowly construed, and if it attempts too much, to be held unconstitutional. In the Formal Style-which held
sway for Gilmore's black night-the purpose of the
existing legal system, according to Llewellyn, "was
not to follow society, but to discipline society and to
control it; criteria for handling cases are to be found
... exclusively within the legal system, not outside
it; and what a court deduces from the existing mauKarl Uwellyn, The Common Law Tradition:DecidingAppeals
(Boston: Little, Brown, 1960); Juriprudence: Realism is Theory
and Practice (Chicago: U. Chi. Pres, 1962).
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terials is what it is that court's duty to proclaim,
come hell or high water, and that is what both ju.
dicial conscience and judicial independence are forn
Jurisprudential scholars have always looked for
stages in the law-whether it is in their own law or
Roman law, and the search seems to be to find something inevitable in the movement. 'lb some extent
it is like tracing the development of a language, as
Savigny pointed out," for law is a language and sub.
ject to the same kinds of influences. What one sees
in the Llewellyn and Gilmore formulations, at least
in part, is the alternation of periods of expansion in
the law with periods of consblidation. Llewellyn,
commenting on Roscoe Pound's division of American
law into three eras: formative, mature, and sociological, wrote, "The sequence 'movement-consolidation-movement' holds, without question.:1 I think
we have to realize that we are not just talking law
then, but government, and notjust government, but
the society as a whole. But it is correct that one can
find periods when the Court takes for itself a greater
leeway of action, and this affects the Court's technique, and, of course, it affects the law itself.
There is, I think, a pattern of judicial reasoning
in common law cases, which grows by comparing
cases and reasoning by example or analogy from one
particular situation to another-thus having a strong
inductive element, and yet feeling the necessity to
remold and announce rules which justify the new
result reached. The new rule, which may have found
new meanings in old language, thus becomes a kind
of neutral principle which will be changed again in
the future. The development of the law of torts is
filled with such examples. On the other hand, the
interpretation of legislation places a different task
on the courts and involves a kind of deductive reasoning, since the words are fixed in the statute and
are there to be applied. The initial interpretation of
these words-which may be very ambiguous wordsby the courts, in early decisions under the statute,
are likely to fix the meaning of the legislation in a
way that subsequent decisions of the courts in common law cases are not fixed. So there is a rigidity
and fixity in statutory interpretation. A third kind

nLIewellyn, Jurisprudence, 308-4.
MPrderick Charles von Savipy, "Origin of Positive Law," in Of
the Vocation of Our Age for Legislation and Jurispredence, trans.
Abraham Hayward (London: Littlewood, 1831).
5
Llewellyn, Jurisprudence, 179.
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of reasoning involves the written constitution. Written constitutional provisions are like statutes in that
the constitution has set words. But when the court
says this is a constitution and not a statute, it often
means that the words are to be allowed to change
in meaning, and that they are subject to reinterpretation as though they were common law concepts.
And then the court means something more. It means,
as Justice Frankfurter said (almost as soon as he
found his seat on the bench), "The ultimate touch.
stone of constitutionality is the Constitution itself
and not what we have said about it"H The written
constitution therefore gives the court great powernot just great power to declare legislation invalid,
as Chief Justice Marshall found, but great power to
disregard prior decisions of the court itself, to tear
up whole periods of interpretation, and to start over
again. It was not until 1966 that the Law Lords in
England announced that they were not absolutely
bound by their prior decisions. One has to compare
with this the American Court's view that where the
written Constitution is involved, a Court cannot be
bound by its prior opinions. Of course it is somewhat
bound--otherwise judicial opinions would be, as Justice Roberta complained (and almost every United
States Supreme Court justice who site long enough
has sometimes complained) a "restricted railroad
ticket, good for this day and train only"3
So there is a good deal of the common law type of
reasoning in the constitutional cases, incremental
reasoning-reasoning by example-which it is easier for a court to use when big changes would be
bogged down by hot disputes covering matters of
policy. Thus at a time when the United States Supreme Court was refusing to permit national reguNGraves v. N.Y. a rel.. O'Keefe, 300 US. 466 (1939) at 491-92.
3Smmith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944) at 669. See Justide
Douglas in Screws etal v. U.S., 325 U.S.01 (1945) at 112:"It should
be good for more than one day only"
In support of his argument that it was Intended by the framers
of the Constitution that the Supreme Court of the United States
should be the final arbiter of the constitutionality of acts by the
state, by the national authority, by the legislature, or by the executie, Justic. 9ry, in his Commenaries on the Constitution of
the U,..tre .liaus, emphasizes that "by the known course of the
common law,"judicial decisions of the highest tribunal set principles
which "bind future cases of the same nature" He writes: "A more
alarming doctrine could not be promulgated by any American court,
than, that it was at liberty to disregard all former rules and decisions, and to decide for itself, without reference to the settled course
of antecedent principles.' vol. 1. 1833 ad., 349-50.
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lation to wipe out child labor in the states by closing
the channels of interstate commerce to the products
of that labor, it found no difficulty in closing the
channels of interstate commerce to the transportation of women for immoral purposes or to the trans.
portation of diseased cattle, or adulterated foods, or
similar products in which it found similarity. And
when the Court had walked a considerable distance
down this road, it found it easier to uphold a national
statute regulating wages and hours. When the Court
did so, it referred to these cases where obnoxious
things had been kept out of interstate commerce to
show there was a general powbr to prohibit and regulate, for the distinction which had made an exception of deleterious and harmful products "was novel
when made and unsupported by any provision of the
Constitution."a Those cases had been used as stepping stones, and when they were no longer needed,
their separate classification was abandoned. You will
find this going on continually. It makes for a certain
adroitness on the part of the Court.
It isthe same kind of adroitness which is exhibited
by the Supreme Court in the Griswold case in 1965
when it held unconstitutional a Connecticut statute
which made it a criminal offense to use "any drug,
medicinal article or instrument for the purpose of
preventing conception." The statute was unconstitutional, the Court said, through Justice Douglas,
because it applied to married persons, and "Marriage
is a coming together for better or for worse, hopefully
enduring, and intimate to the degree of being sacred." Marriage was "an association for as noble a
purpose as any involved in our prior decisions." Then
seven years later the Court in Eisenstedt v.Baird,*
dealing with a Massachusetts statute which prohibited the sale or the exhibiting or offering to give
away of contraceptives, but made special provisions
for married persons, said that such a prohibition was
a denial of equal protection to unmarried persons,
since under Griswold the restriction on the sale to
T

United States v. Darby, 812 U.S. 100 (1941) at 116.

OGriswold et a. v.Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) at 486.
*Eisesnatadt v. Balrd, 405 U.S. 488 (1972). Justice Brenan's

opinion for the Court was aplurality opinion. Justic Douglasjolned
In the opinion but preferred the narrower ground that the violation
was a giving away of a package in the course ofa lectue. Justice
White. Joined by Justice Blackmun, concurred in the result; the
record did not disclose the marital status of the reciplent "and therefore I percive no reason for reaching the novel constitutional quetion whether aState may restrict or forbid the distribution of o*
traceptives to the unmarried...:"
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married persons would be unconstitutional. It is
hard to believe the Court in Griswold didn't know
where it was going. But it didn't say so. It took one
step at a time and then in Bisenatedt disclosed what
it had done.
If one tries to answer, or perhaps avoid answering,
Hart's question as to what general conception of the
nature of law the American government of superintendence over the country by courts is compatible
with, possibly one should say it arises out of the
necessities of American life. It is a companion of the
freedom we desire and the cruelty and ruggedness
of human nature. I am not particularly pleased with
this answer, but I fear it has a lot to it. Much of
American history, and the history of the courts in
the United States, has been shaped by the existence
of slavery, for almost half the existence of the American republic, and the continuation of the after effects of slavery during the republic's second century.
It was this taint which made John Adams shudder
in recalling James Otis' argument based on natural
rights in the Writs of Assistance case. The taint of
black chattel slavery was built into the American
Constitution. The fugitive slave provision of the Constitution was an essential part of the bargain which
made for the original compact. It explicitly prevented free states from giving freedom to slaves escaping from slave states. It was a lawyer's provision
intended to keep Lord Mansfield's judgment in the
1771 case of James Sommereett' from being applicable as among the states of the Union. James Sommersett had been purchased as a slave in Virginia,
taken by his master to England, had escaped in England, then seized by agents for his master and
placed in chains on a boat lying in the Thames. The
boat was to go to Jamaica where Sommeruett was
to be resold. A motion for a writ of habeas corpus
was brought before Lord Mansfield. He granted the
writ and ultimately ordered that "the black must be
discharged." Mansfield refused to accept, as a justification for holding Sommersett in irons in England,
the Virginia law of slavery. "The state of slavery
. . . is so odious that nothing can be suffered to support it but positive law." Mansfield found no such
positive law in England supportive of the Virginia
imposed slave status. The fugitive slave provision
of the Constitution supplied that positive law as
"The Case of Jams Sommersett, A Negro, on HabosCorpus,
Kings Bench, 20 How.86Tr: (1771-1772).
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among the states. Distinguished judges such as Juetice Story and Chief Justice Shaw had to bow to it.
The history gives evidence of the force of a custom
and prejudice so strong that one cannot say Chief
Justice 'Ihney was wrong in the conclusion that a
country whose documents spoke so nobly of the
rights of men, simply did not include in its compact
the idea that slaves were ofthe human race intended
by these words. Nor can one say that Justice Douglas
was wrong as late as 1968 when concurring with an
opinion, reviving and changing completely the inter.
pretation of a civil rights statute originally passed
in 1866, giving all citizens the iame rights as white
citizens to purchase, lease and sell real and personal
property, he spoke of the "jurisprudence of a nation
striving to rejoin the human race."'
Professor Enkers has discussed Brown u.Minissippi.0 This case was pivotal in changing the approach of the United States Supreme Court toward
state court criminal trials. One has to ask how in
1936, in a civilized country, with state government
officials and courts on duty, a case would have to
come to the Supreme Court of the federal government from proceedings in a state court, where under
the guidance of a deputy sheriff, defendants had
confessions beaten out of them over a period of days;
and all of this was admitted. Chief Justice Hughes
characterized what had occurred as "trial by ordeal.'
One has to ask where were the judges and the lawyers and the state officials with responsibility for the
minimum essentials of fair criminal justice procedures and for the correction within the state itself
for such egregious deviations.
So far as the aftermath of slavery was concerned,
federalism has not worked in the United States if
one removes the supervision of the Supreme Court.
Granted that at times the leadership of the United
States Supreme Court was not helpful, the hands-off
attitude of the Supreme Court, both for itself and for
the federal government as a whole, did not result in
justice. It did not result in justice in criminal proceedings; it did not result in justice in the ordinary
affairs of life, such as buying or selling or gaining
accommodations; and it did not result in justice in
42 iones et ex.

v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 400 (1968) at 409.

*Arnold N.Enker, Professor of Law at Bar lan University, Israel,
lectured at the Salaburg Seminar on American criminal law. He
ws a Visiting Profese at the University Of Chicago Law School
during the 1976-77 scademic year.
43297 U.S. 278 (1936).
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schooling. The intervention of the Court was a nec.
esity, and so interrelated are the affairs of life that
once begun it is hard to know where there is an area
for nonintervention. The intervention of the Court
in Brown v.BoardofEducation in 1954 to stop state
segregation of black and white school children in.
volved the Supreme Court in a bitter fight of many
years. It no doubt helped convince many judges of
the evil intentions of their fellow citizens-and that
too is a legacy which has to be overcome. The form
of the intervention, too-making the federal district
courts almost and sometimes in fact receivers for the
schools-pushed the courts into a kind of administration which we had learned to expect for failed
railroads, but not over units of local government.
Again the proliferations of these kinds of intervention into other fields are many-to state prisons,
hospitals for the mentally retarded, hiring for police
departments-not complete supervision over local
functions, but close to it. Mayors and governors discovered how not to do their duty, but to leave it to
the federal courts. But what reason is there to think
that the needed steps would ever have been taken
without federal court intervention?
Perhaps among the most surprising of the interventions by the Supreme Court was in the 1960's
when it ordered changes in the districting for voters
both for state legislatures and for the federal congres. A believer in democratic government, with the
voice of the people expressed through their legislative representatives, might have thought these legislative bodies could have been relied upon to take
care of such a matter. But it did not happen that
way. With this intervention into what seems a political sphere, one wonders what is left of the idea
that matters of political speculation are for the legislative branch, not the court. Each intervention by
the Court has brought it new cases, and with it a
sense of injustice if the Court does not act. The contraceptive statutes were silly statutes as Justice
Stewart wrote in Griswold, in dissent from his colleagues. He pointed out that the Court only two years
before had pronounced that the due process clause
was no longer regarded as a proper instrument for
determining "the wisdom, need and propriety of
state laws." But he was in dissent. A court that
44In Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 376 at 730 quoting from Olsen
v.Nebraska esrel. Western Reference & Bond Asn., 313 U.S. 236.
246(1941).
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holds itself out to correct the injustices of the statutes
of fifty states and of the federal government Itself
has become, as Learned Hand predicted, a bevy of
guardians. But perhaps a necessary bevy of guardans.
It is not surprising either, with so much injustice
to correct, that the interpretation ofthe Constitution
has been reinvigorated almost in natural law terms.
In Griswold, the Court noticed that the Ninth
Amendment stated that "the enumeration in the
Constitution of certain rights, shall not be construed
to deny or disparage others retained by the people"
So there it was in plain words-the rights which the
people had before, their natural rights one might as
well say, were now part of the Constitution itself.
Thus no specific provision of the Constitution need
be relied upon in dealing, for example, with the right
to travel,' or in taking the lead in effect to enact
within the Court a statute on abortion And so
when it comes to the ikustlce of a city's housing
code, which defined a single family so as to exclude
within the permitted family unit a grandchild with
the relationship of rst cousinship to another ree.
dent grandchid, Justice Powell arrects the injutice.* br the violation of the city ordinance, the
grandmother had been convicted ofa crime; the Ohio
Court of Appeals had affirmed the conviction, ad
the Ohio Supreme Court had denied review. Justice
Powell recogniass that what he Is doing, although
"history counsels caution and restraint" is a continuation of substantive due process. The sanctity of
the family was involved. James Wilson perhaps
would have included the circumstances ofthis fmily
unit within the category of natural rights which he
termed "peculiar relations"46
*381 U.S. 479at 44 09I6). Se Justle Douglas dissenting hem
the denial of crtfiori in Olef . East Side Union High Sehool
District. 409 U.S. 1043 at 1044 (1972): "t wod liberty is aet
defined in the Constituto. But, as we held in Griswold v. Co.
neetieut.... It includes at leant the ndamental rights retained
by the people' under the Ninth Amedment"
'Shapire v.Thompson, 84 U8. 818 at 30 (1900).
"'Roe et Al. v Wade. 410 U.S. 118 (1978); Doe v. Bolton., 410 U.S
1794 (197).
Whoe Moore v. City of East Cleveland Ohio, 431 U.S. 4N (1977).
*Jams Wilson, Lectures on Lew, 1804, vol. 2(Cambridge. Mas.:
Belknap Press Bdition. 1957) p.52. Cf.Justice Powell, coocarrn
in part and concurring in the judpent in Caey v. Population
Services lItern., 97 Sep.Ct. 1011 (1977) at 302 and 2029 dealing
with parental guidance.
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This thean is a description of the sovereignty of the
courts-of their superintendence over a society-"so
unlike what ordinary courts ordinarily do.' It Is a
description of perhaps the most important aspect of
the present American form of governance. The form
is a unique answer to the problems of popular sovereignty and of Moderalism.It has its proponents and
its critics. Critice see the courts deciding policy matterm which perhaps life-tenured judges do not hold
their commissions to determine, and of turning policy matters into principles beyond the reach of poUtical discussion and voting. The crities se the
courts a having made it easy for democratic assemblis not to grow in responsibility; as having turned
local issues into national ones, and then failing to
make the national Congress and not the Court the
legislative assembly on many issues now made astional.* The assumption of executive powers by the
courts seems to the critics often to have been awkward and irresponsible. The proponents see the
growth of court government as a wonderlbl invention through which the Court, as a tribune of the
people, incorporates a kind of participatory democ.
racy, keeps fresh the discussion of basic values, protects popular sovereignty while limiting it, corrects
voting by special protection for the weak and minorities, and helps steer the course of a country by
an inner compassO

In any event, If we would understand it, we should
remember the necessities out of which this form of
government has grown-the assidents of history but
also the strengths and weaknssss of our nature. No
doubt the form will continue to grow and perhaps to
change.

SSW AssUe lWs&
la s Rnr T.Ran of assbaso,
8M U. eM at 878.-0 (190 and cf stambhu v. Moga. 84
UL 641 at 49 aW OM (19) a the disseat by JaNse Harlan
at6657.
Mar emphais Onhe iner cam w Rolw. The Ideat d
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